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In the philosophy of Nyaya-Vasesika, there are several ways of defining the sense-horizon of meaning. The existential-ontological approach is based on the analysis of the fundamental principles of Nyaya-Vaisesika categoriology. The Dasein's sense-horizon of meaning is defined by a special kind of philosophical archaeology which explores the grammatical layers giving rise to this or that philosophical category. Even the term padartha "category" itself contains the "semantic power" of meaning (artha). If, however, we take padartha to be the thing referred to by a word, as suggested by Karl H. Potter (1957), we should adopt the standpoint of the ontological realism. Then all the categories of Nyaya-Vasesika would be given credit as things to which words refer, which would obviously conflict with the common-sense realism of the school. According to this kind of realism, to be a thing (artha) means to possess the universal of satta "existentiality." There are only three categories possessing existentiality — dravya (substance), guna (quality), and karma (action). All the rest are lacking satta, and as a result cannot be labeled 'things'. Moreover, it is absurd to maintain that negative facts, reflected by the category abhava (non-being, absence) can be things too. The existential-ontological approach is therefore quite inconsistent while defining the nature of meaning. Padartha, when interpreted as "thing to which a word refers," cannot be our guide in the apprehension of meaning.
The universally ontological approach is to a great extent free from the absurdities of postulating non-existing entities. This approach requires interpreting padartha as the "meaning of the word." As far as all categories are something nameable (abhidheya) we can ascribe some ontic value to the six categories of Nyaya-Vaisesika. Yet it should be stressed that the last three categories, samanya (universal), visesa (particular) and samavaya (inherence) are not existential categories (cf. the phenomenological difference between Dasein and Sosein). Then, even abhava (absence, non-existence) could be treated as a full-fledged category. Despite its non-ontic character, this padartha represents a large section of the nameable world containing the coonterrelates (pratiyogi) of all affirming negations. Following this pattern of reasoning, we can define 'meaning' as a 'kind of rational construction applied to the individual with respect to its genus and form.' We should bear in mind that, according to Gautama, the form (akrti) is the mark of the "genus" (jati). (Tailanga 1896:126)
Seen from ontological point of view, meaning has considerably greater extension than being. The semantic field of meaning is divided into two vast regions, the region of being and the region of non-being. The former is subdivided into existential and non-existential ontic spheres, viz., sattavat and asattavat.
One cannot help noticing the great similarities existing between the theory of Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Gegenstandstheorie of Alexius von Meinong. When subsumed under the notion of intentionality, the objects (Gegenstande) divide, according to Meinong, along the main streams of intentional life of consciousness into objects of judging, assessing, desiring, etc. When, however, subsumed under the notion of being, the objects come to be divided into existing, subsisting, and extra-ontic. There is close resemblance between subsistence and the way samanya, visesa and samavaya are conceived. The only difference seems to subsist between the categories of abhava and Aussein. Abhava may have as its pratiyogin (counterrelate) something that was, is (at some other place), or will be existing, while the pratiyogin of Aussein is completely outside being. In our opinion, Aussein is but a particular mode of abhava, to wit, atyantabhava (absolute non-being), examples of which are the round square, the son of a barren woman, the hare's horn, etc.
The third way of defining what meaning can be draws our attention to the theories of the ancient Indian grammarians. It consists in the elucidation of the categories of substance, quality and action from the point of view of their function in a sentence. Here, the total meaning of a group of words, be it a phrase, a clause or a full sentence, is called anvaya (congruence) and is regarded as the relation of what is meant by one word to what is meant by another word in that group. The concept of sakti (semantic power) is a natural corollary to this view. According to the followers of Prabhakara, sakti takes place with reference to what is congruent with something else (itaranvita), that is, with some action (kriyanvita). This particular standpoint is known as anvitabhidhana, "denomination of what is predicated by the logical concomitance of the words." The Naiyayikas hold that sakti is grasped with regard to anvaya, because the information about the congruence (here, logical concomitance) comes about only through the meaning of the sentence (vakyarthata). It is from the sentence, and not from this or that word, that one realizes the meaning of any particular construction. This position is denoted as abhihitanvaya.
The fourth approach to a possible theory of meaning is developed within the framework of the sakti-vada, the teaching of the semantic power of the word. In order to define the meaning of a word of sentence, we should activate the semantic power of this particular word or sentence and perceive it through a special kind of contemplation, dhi (cf. Sastri 1923:81). Sakti is definhed by Visvanatha as the relation of the meaning of the word to the word itself (cf. Sastri 1923:235). The perception of the semantic power is said to depend on several factors such as grammar, comparison, dictionary, statements of some trusted person, practical expressions, supplementary notions, interpretation and nearness to a well-known world.
The apprehension of the semantic power of the root (dhatu), inflective base (prakrti) and the suffix (pratyaya) comes about by means of grammar (vyakarana) as, for instance, in the expression Caitrah pacati "Caitra cooks". Sakti is perceived here with regard to the action of cooking, that is, Caitra is defined through an action related to cooking.
The perception of sakti through comparison (upamana) is well-known and therefore I will not discuss it in detail. The perception of sakti through dictionary (kosa) can be seen with reference to the quality 'blue.' The word 'blue' is said to connote any blue object.
The sakti of the word pika (cuckoo) is derived from the sentence of an authority (apta-vakya) establishing the meaning of the word pika as equal to that of the word kokila (another type of Indian cuckoo).
The next manner of grasping sakti depends on some practical expressions (vyavahara) used in the sentence-production process. The semantic power of the word pot is grasped by a third person from the master's ordering the servant to bring the pot and from the servant's bringing the pot to the master. The sakti of the word pot is seen as being logically concomitant with the action of bringing it.
The perception of sakti from the supplement of a sentence (vakya-sesa) takes place when in one sentence, the word has a very specific meaning (asadharana) while in another sentence it is more general. The word yava means for the aryan "long sting" (dirgha suka) while for the foreigner (mleccha) it is no more than "corn." Thus, with respect to the long sting, semantic power of yava is established due to a supplement specifying the meaning of that word in a particular sentence.
The seventh method for grasping sakti depends on its elucidation (vivarana). About this method, Visvanatha says:
Elucidation, however, is the explanation of the meaning of a given [word] with the help of another word possessing a meaning which is common to this word, as for instance, the apprehension of the semantic power of the word pot takes place with regard to [the word] jar due to the elucidation of what exists as a pot with the help of something else that exists as a jar. The conceptualization of the verbal termination in [the expression] pakam karoti "he cooks (lit. he makes cooking)" arises here in the same way thanks to the elucidation of what cooks (pacati) with the help of what makes (karoti). (Sastri 1923:118).
The last way of perceiving the semantic power of the word is brought about through proximity (samnidhi). It is said, for instance, that in the sentence "On the mango tree there is a dickoo sweetly singing", the sakti of the word pika (cuckoo) is grasped via the word kokila.
The opponents of Nyaya-Vaisesika maintain that one should not relate sakti to the individual (vyakti) because of the impending regressus ad infinitum (anantya) and the possibility of deviations (vyabhicara). They claim that the information about the individual is wholy included in the knowledge of the genus, because the knowledge of the genus does not arise without the knowledge of the individual. This, however, is not the case. It is clear that the knowledge of the individual does not take place without the apprehension of the semantic power of the word referring to that particular individual. Nor does the connotation (laksana) refer to the individual because it is known that the individual is apprehended just from the direct meaning of the word, and not from its transpositional (laksanika) meaning (Dvivedi 1886:16). Nor is there any kind of regressus ad infinitum with regard to the semantic power of the individual as there is only one sakti inherent in all the individuals.
If one takes the cow to be semantically potential, one should as a result perceive sakti only with regard to that individual cow. If, however, the cow-ness, i.e., the genus of all individual cows is to be defined as being semantically potential and, on account of this, as the residence of sakti, then there would be no remembrance of the meaning of the word determining (prakaraka) the general class of cowness, as well as no verbal knowledge at all. The reasons for this are to be seen in the fact that both remembrance of the meaning of the word and the verbal knowledge are based on a common determination (prakarakatva).
If the objection is raised that sakti should be realized by means of the class of the classes of cows (gotvatva), then one should recognize that it is the cowness (gotva) that must be defined as the determinator (avacchedaka) of the semantic potentiality (sakyata), that is, of the very possibility to be semantically potential. Cownessness, however, is inherent in all individual and universal cow-related entities.
As far as it is possible to learn something about this or that individual from its genus and form, one should resort to the semantic power of the word as found in the individual and specified by its genus and form. Thus the meaning of the word is to be understood as the potential unity of the individual, form and genus (Tailanga 1896: II.2.96). Again the semantic power of the word is related only to the individual as specified by its genus and form.
The words possessing sakti are divided into four general groups:
(1) Yaugika is that word the meaning of which is grasped from its parts as, for instance, the word pacaka;
(2) Rudha is the word whose meaning is derived from its own semantic 'power' only as, for instance, the words go, mandala, ap, etc.;
(3) Yoga-rudha is the word whose semantic 'power' exists independently of the semantic powers of its component parts as, for instance, the word pankaja, which means "lotus" despite the fact that the semantic 'power' of its constituent parts point to something born in the mud;
(4) Yaugika-rudha is the word whose meaning is grasped from the semantic 'powers' of its parts or from the sakti-rudha, that is, from the holistic power of the word. Thus yaugika-meaning of the word udbhid refers to the tree as something that grows up and comes to be cut some day. Rudha-meaning in this case refers to the germ as generated by corn.
The realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of sakti consists in the way it comes to the perception of the semantic power of a word. Yet most of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas believe that sakti is a "beginningless convention" (anadi-samketa) (Dvivedi 1886:16).
REFERENCES
Dvivedi, Manilal Nabhubhai, ed. 1886. The Tarkakaumudi; being an introduction to the principles of the Vaisheshika and the Nyaya philosophies, by Laugakshi Bhaskara (= Bombay Sanskrit Series, 32.). Bombay: Government Central Book Depot.
Sastri, Dhundhiraj, ed. 1923. Karikavali with two Commentaries Siddhanta-muktavali of Visvandtha Nyaya Pancanana and Nyaya-Candrika by Pandit sri Narayana Tirtha (= Kashi Sanskrit Series, 16, Nyaya Section, 2.). Benares: Jaykrishna Das Gupta.
Tailanga, Gangadhara Sastri, ed. 1896. The Nyayasutras with Vatsyayana's Bhashya and Extracts from the Nyayavarttika and the Tatparyatika (= Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 11.). Benares: Lazarus.
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Published in: Current Advances in Semantic Theory. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series iV: Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, Vol 73). Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins PC, 1992, pp. 183-188.
